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Trial by Peers:




TRIAL BY PEERS would have been unthinkable, and impossible, under the
system of military law from which our own was adopted. That system-the
British-reflected the characteristics of a monarchial, rather than a republi-
can, form of government, and it was under British colonial rule that military
law of the United States had its genesis.' This proved unfortunate, because
class structure pervaded the administration of American military law even
though any classification by caste outside of the military was alien to our
founding philosophy.
2
The British Army, serving a King and officered by the upper classes, con-
stituted a general court-martial at the time of the American Revolution by
convening thirteen or more commissioned officers of field grade.8 Following
*Captain, U.S. Army, Judge Advocate General's Corps. The opinions and conclusions
expressed herein are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of either
The Judge Advocate General's Corps or any other governmental agency.
"WINTHROP, MILITARY LAW AND PRECEDENT 21 (2d ed. 1920); AYCOCK & WURFEL, MILITARY
LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE 9 (1955).
2It is difficult to understand how early America could compose general courts-martial from
an all-officer upper class, while professing the following belief found in the Declaration of
Independence: "that all men are created equal; that they are endowed, by their Creator,
with certain unalienable right; that these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness."
For a detailed discussion of how our early military law was designed for empires and
monarchies, where the officers spring from the aristocracy while the mass of the Army is
recruited from the lower classes, see Morgan, Military Justice, reprinted in Hearings on S.
64 before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Military Affairs, 66th Cong., 1st & 2d
Sess., 1388-1395 (1919). For similar expressions by a former Acting Judge Advocate General
of the Army, see Ansell, Military Justice, 5 CORNELL L.Q. 1 (1919) and Ansell, Some Reforms
in our System of Military Justice, 32 YALE L.J. 146 (1922).
8
WINTHROP, op. cit. supra note 1, at appendix VII, 931-942. The British Articles of War of
1765 provided in Article I, Section XV: "A general court-martial ... shall not consist of less
than thirteen officers ... nor [shall they] be under the Degree of a Field Officer."
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this pattern, the first military code for American colonial troops, the so-called
Massachusetts Articles, adopted April 5, 1775, provided for an identical gen-
eral court-martial.4 The first National Articles, adopted June 30, 1775, pro-
vided: "No general court-martial shall consist of a less number than thirteen
... commissioned officer[s]. ..5
The Articles of 1775 were so strongly influenced by the British system that
they referred to the colonists as His Majesty's most faithful subjects. With
the approach of the revolution, it became necessary to abolish allegiance to
the Crown. In order to accomplish this, the Congress appointed a Committee
on June 14, 1776, to study and revise the Articles of War.6 Since the Commit-
tee was composed of John Adams, Thomas Jefferson, John Rutledge, James
Wilson, and R. R. Livingston, one would have anticipated that a distinctive
American democratic flavor would be instilled into any code which it rec-
ommended for the government of men who were created equal. Nothing
could be further from what occurred. John Adams, apparently deeply im-
pressed by the British Army and in control of the Committee, states "There
was extant one system of articles of war which had carried two empires to
the head of mankind, the Roman and the British; for the British articles of
war were only a literal translation of the Roman. It would be in vain for us
to seek in our own inventions, or the records of warlike nations, for a more
complete system of military discipline ... I was, therefore, for reporting the
British articles of war Totidem Verbis."7 In so many words, the code of 1776
did adopt the British Articles of War except for any expression of allegiance
to the Crown, and while enlarging and modifying the Articles of 1775, it re-
cast them into the arrangement of the British Articles under separate sec-
tions. And like its predecessors, it provided that "A general court-martial in
the United States shall not consist of less than thirteen commissioned officers.
."8
This code of 1776 was amended in 1786, providing that "General courts-
martial may consist of any number of commissioned officers from 5 to 13 in-
clusively; but they shall not consist of less than 13 where that number can
be convened without manifest injury to the service." 9 This provision was in-
'Article 32 reads in part: "No general .court martial shall consist of a less number than
thirteen, none of which shall be under the degree of a Field officer .. " For a reprint of the
Massachusetts Articles, see WINTHROP, op. cit. supra note 1, at appendix VIII, 947-950. See
generally Article 37, Massachusetts Articles, for the composition of Regimental (Special)
courts-martial.
6 Art. XXXIII. See WINTHROP, op. cit. supra note 1, at appendix IX, 953 at 956, See gener-
ally Article XXXVIII for the composition of Regimental (Special) courts-martial.
6 1 JOUR. CONG. 374 (1776).
73 WoRKs OF JOHN ADAMS 68 (C. F. Adams ed. 1850-1856).
8 See Article 1, of Section XIV, American Articles of War of 1776. They are reprinted in
WINTHROP, op. cit. supra note 1, at appendix , 961-967. See generally Article 11 for the com-
position requirements of Regimental (Special) courts-martial.
9 WINTHROP, op. cit. supra note 1, at appendix XI, 972. This change came about because
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cluded as Article 6410 of the code of 1806, Article 7511 of the code of 1874, and
Article 512 of the 1916 amendments.
In that fashion, the composition of American courts-martial followed the
all-officer course set for us by the British. In 1918 officials within the Office of
The Judge Advocate General in the War Department attempted to alter this
course. Their spokesman, General Samuel T. Ansell, based upon his first-
hand knowledge of military justice, recommended new Articles of War, "...
to supercede personal Military Power over Military Justice by Public Law."'18
To do this, Ansell believed, it was necessary that the new Articles of War re-
gard ". . .grade in the Army as a requisite of authority only, and not as mark-
ing a caste with established rights of preferment in matters of Justice."' 4 Thus
the American court-martial's composition, based as it was upon the British
principle of hereditary nobility, would have to be changed to reflect the
democratic philosophy under which all Americans lived, except those in the
American Military Establishment. His draft of proposed Articles of War was
introduced in the Senate by Senator Chamberlain) and in the House by Con-
gressman Royal Johnson. 16 It entitled enlisted members to serve on both gen-
eral and special courts-martial.' 7 If a private or noncommissioned officer were
to be tried by a general court-martial, three-eighths of the court-martial mem-
bership would be privates or noncommissioned officers, respectively.' 8 With
special courts-martial, the proportion would be one-third.19 This equalitarian
requiring thirteen officers on every general court-martial failed to make adequate provision
for the trial of accused serving in small and isolated units. In addition, Article 3 reduced the
number of officers required to compose a Regimental (Special) court-martial to three.
10 The British Articles of War had always been arranged in Sections. The American Articles
of War followed this arrangement until 1806 when it was abandoned, and it has never been
resumed. See WINTHROP, op. cit. supra note 1, at appendix XII, 976-981. See generally Article
66 for the three officer composition of Regimental (Special) courts-martial.
" WINTHROP, op. cit. supra note 1, at appendix XIII, 986-992. See generally Articles 80 and
82 concerning the three officer composition of Regimental (Special) courts-martial.
IAct of Aug. 29, 1916, ch. 418, Art. 5, 39 Stat. 650, 651.
Morgan, The Existing Court-Martial System and the Ansell Army Articles, 29 YALE L.J.
52, 73 n. 80 (1919).
"Ibid.
15S. 64, 66th Cong., 1st Sess., (1919). Where it became known as the Chamberlain bill.
1" H.R. 367, 66th Cong., lst Sess., (1919).
17 Art. 4. For interesting, and sometimes vitriolic, discussions of the proposed provisions
entitling enlisted members to serve on general and special courts-martial, see Hearings on
S. 64 before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Military Affairs, 66th Cong., 1st &
2d Sess., at 32-35, 276-279, 350-351, 433-434, 537-540 and 1378 (1919).
18 Proposed Article 5 stated: "General courts shall consist of eight members, three of whom
in the case of the trial of a private soldier shall be privates, and in the case of the trial of a
noncommissioned officer or warrant officer shall be noncommissioned or warrant officers,
respectively."
19 Proposed Article 6 stated: "Special courts shall consist of three members, one of whom
in the case of the trial of a private soldier shall be a private, and in the case of the trial of
a noncommissioned or warrant officer shall be a noncommissioned or warrant officer, respec-
tively." This equalitarianism was both opposed and supported by members of the American
Bar Association, see Morgan, supra note 13, at 58, n. 21.
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philosophy was strongly opposed 20 by those in the War Department whom
Professor Morgan called "the conservatives of the regular service ... "21 Their
influence with the Congress resulted in the removal of all proposals from the
Articles of War as enacted in 192022 to provide enlisted members with repre-
sentation on courts-martial. With minor modifications, these class oriented
Articles of War of 1920 controlled military justice until after World War
11.28
Subsequent to the first attempted reform movement in American military
law (the 1918-1920 Ansell reform movement), tranquility prevailed for mili-
tary justice until shortly after World War II. This was to be but a lull before
the storms which revolutionized the military justice system, infusing into it
partial democratic reforms. The second reform movement-which culmi-
nated in the Elston Act-originated in federal court cases where petitioners
seeking writs of habeas corpus alleged that all-officer military tribunals in-
fringed upon their constitutionally protected interests. But the federal
courts refused to substitute their judgment for age-old military practices.
24
This forced the ascending storm of criticism surrounding military justice
back into the legislative arena.
II.
THE 1948 AMENDED ARTIcLEs OF WAR-THE ELSTON ACT
A. Public dissatisfaction with military justice.
With the end of World War II, the American Army returned from the con-
flict against Germany and Japan to tumultuous victory celebrations. Crowds
cheered as the soldiers passed in review. Casual civilian observers, unfamil-
21 Morgan, The Background of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, 6 VAND. L. REv. 169,
172 (1952).
21 Morgan, supra note 20, at 170. For an articulate statement of the traditional military
viewpoint, see Bogert, Courts-Martial: Criticisms and Proposed Reforms, 5 CORNaELL L.Q. 18
(1919). Bogert strongly opposed enlisted membership on courts-martial, Bogert, supra at 32.
Act of June 4, 1920, ch. 227, arts. 1-121, 41 Stat. 787. Article 5 reads, "General courts-
martial may consist of any number of officers not less than five," while Article 6 states
"Special courts-martial may consist of any number of officers not less than three."
2 Wurfel, Military Habeas Corpus, 49 MIcH L. Rv. 493, 504-505 (1951).
2 4In Adams v. Hiatt, 79 F. Supp. 433 (M.D. Pa. 1948), the issue was disposed of simply by
stating ".... to those in the military service, military law is due process of law." For similar
reasoning, see Dewar v. Hunter, 170 F. 2d 993 (10th Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 337 U.S. 908
(1949). Finally in Whelchel v. McDonald, 176 F.2d 260 (5th Cir. 1949), motion for rehearing
and stay of judgment denied, 178 F. 2d 760 (5th Cir. 1949), aff'd 340 U.S. 122 (1950), the issue
was put to rest. Whelchel's general court-martial was governed by the 1920 Articles of War,
as amended, but when the case was before the United States Supreme Court the Elston Act
amendments, 62 Stat. 604, 628, permitted enlisted membership on courts-martial. Mr. Justice
Douglas, commenting on all-officer courts-martial, said: "Courts-martial have been composed
of officers both before and after the adoption of the Constitution. The constitution of courts-
martial, like other matters relating to their organization and administration .... is a matter
appropriate for congressional action." 340 U.S. at 127.
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iar with the internal workings of this mighty war machine, were unaware of
the seething discontent within the ranks caused by an archaic system of mili-
tary justice.
Returned to civilian life and free of military censorship, American soldiers
began to voice their complaints against the military system under which they
had won the war. Mildly at first, then rising in tempo, finally reaching a
grand crescendo of contumely in the spring of 1946; it could no longer be
ignored. 25
In order to determine the causes of so much discontent with the Army, the
then Secretary of War, the Honorable Robert P. Patterson, on March 18,
1946, appointed a board of officers and enlisted men to study officer-enlisted
man relationships. 26 The Board found that the Army structure in 1946 was
based upon a caste system.27 As a result, many officers abused enlisted men by
improperly exercising their rank and privileges as officers.28 No single fault
found with the Army, however, was as great as that found with the courts-
martial system. 29 With respect to military justice, the Board stated:
The largest differential [difference in treatment between officers and enlisted
personnel] which brought the most criticism in every instance, was in the field
of.military justice and courts-martial procedure which permitted inequities and
injustices to enlisted personnel.0
Amid the Board's many recommendations for change,81 almost hidden in
obscurity, was the statement "... that enlisted personnel be permitted on
0 For some examples of post-war criticism of the Army, see editorials reprinted in Hear-
ings before the Legal Subcommittee of the House Committee on Armed Services, on H.R.
2575, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 2166-2175 (1947) and 13 U. Cut. L. Rav. 494, 498-500 (1946).
1 This was the famous Doolittle Board named after its Chairman, Lieutenant General
James H. "Jimmy" Doolittle. Other members were Lieutenant General Troy H. Middleton,
Lieutenant Colonel Robert Neville, Captain Adna H. Underhill, Technical Sergeant Jake
W. Lindsey, and Sergeant Meryll M. Frost.
27 Report of the Secretary of War's Board on Officer Enlisted Man Relationships, S. Doc.
No. 196, 79th Cong., 2d Sess., 2 (1946). With respect to criticism of the Army immediately
after the war, the Board said at page 3, "Americans ... strongly resist any growth of an old-
world type of military caste because such would be out of keeping with our democratic
government. Therefore, as soon as soldiers returned to civilian status, many became articu-
late; some vociferous; and a few outright abusive. The peak of editorial attack on the Army
was reached in the spring of 1946."
1 Id. at 10 and 17.
2 It appears strange that authors most conversant with World War II military justice
apparently found it perfect. At least their articles are silent on the subject of inadequacy of
that military law. Compare McCarthy, Administration of Military Justice in the United
States Army, 19 CONN. B. J. 194 (1945) and Saden, Army Justice, 20 CONN. B. J. 106 (1946)
who wrote as active duty judge advocates, with Berry, The Courts-Martial System, Justice or
Tyranny?, 3 J. Mo. B. 54 (1947), a former judge advocate who was highly critical of the
World War II military justice system.
B°Report of the Secretary of War's Board on Officer-Enlisted Man Relationships, S. Doc.
No. 196, 79th Cong., 2d Sess., 12 (1946).
n Id. at 19-22.
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courts .... 3 2 These seven words were ultimately to instill into courts-martial
part of the democratic influences sought in vain in 1919, by General Samuel
T. Ansell.
Even before the Doolittle Board's report was printed, it became apparent
that military justice was the center of extreme controversy. In response to
this criticism a distinguished group of individuals was appointed to a War
Department Advisory Committee on Military Justice. Its Chairman was
Arthur T. Vanderbilt,3 3 and it has subsequently been referred to as the Van-
derbilt Committee. From March 25, 1946, until December 13, 1946, the Com-
mittee investigated military justice, held hearings, and studied voluminous
statistical data received from The Judge Advocate General's Department.
The Vanderbilt Committee recommended, in part, that:
Qualified enlisted men should be eligible to serve as members of general and
special courts-martial and should be appointed thereon to the extent that in the
discretion of the appointing authority, it seems desirable to do so. We realize
that there is a sharp division of opinion on the subject. The generals and com-
missioned officers generally are divided as to the desirability of the proposal,
while a preponderant majority of the enlisted men favor it. Those opposed to it
contend that since the movement of qualified men in the Army is upward, the
appointment of enlisted men will lower the quality of the courts and give rise to
personal antagonism and recrimination in Army units when enlisted men par-
ticipate in the conviction and sentence of their fellows. We think, however, that
some improvement of the morale of the enlisted men may follow from increas-
ing their knowledge of the functioning of the Army system of Justice, their con-
fidence in its operation and their feeling of responsibility for the enforcement of
Army discipline. (Emphasis added).
3 4
92Id. at 21.
11 The Committee was appointed by War Department Memorandum No. 25-46 dated
March 25, 1946. The other members of the Committee were Alexander Holtzoff, Walter P.
Armstrong, Frederick E. Crane, Joseph W. Henderson, William T. Joyner, Jacob M. Lashly,
Morris A. Soper, and Floyd E. Thompson. Perhaps the War Department was induced to act
by the report of the House Committee on Military Affairs, Investigation of the National War
Effort, H.R. REP. No. 2722, 79th Cong., 2d Sess., (1946). This report, dated August 1, 1946,
contained sixteen recommendations which called for general reform in military law. Recom-
mendation 3 reads as follows:
That Congress consider amending article of war 4 in such manner as to provide that when
charges are brought against enlisted men for trial by special or general court-martial, they
shall be informed of their right to have enlisted men sit on the court;
That if the accused so request, enlisted men shall be appointed to the number of one-third
of the total membership of the court;
That enlisted men so appointed shall be selected from other companies or equivalent
organizations than that of the accused person and that of the officer bringing the charges; and
That failure to comply with this provision shall be a jurisdictional error.
"Report of the War Department Advisory Committee on Military Justice, 14 J.B.A.D.C.
69, 85 (1947). Note that the underscored report recommended that an accused's right to en-
listed court members should be discretionary with the appointing authority, but this was
rejected by Congress in enacting the Elston Act, 62 Stat. 624 (1948).
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With the Vanderbilt Committee's imprimatur on enlisted membership for
courts-martial, support for the movement gained tremendous momentum.3 5
The subsequent approval of the enlisted member proposal by the War De-
partment 0 assured that the experiment would be tried.
B. Article 4-Enlisted members qualify.
The Committee hearings in the Congress on the Elston Act favored enlisted
membership on courts-martial,37 as did the floor debate. 38 As enacted, the
pertinent part of the enlisted member provision reads:
Enlisted persons ... shall be competent to serve on general and special courts-
martial for the trial of enlisted persons when requested in writing by the ac-
cused at any time prior to the convening of the court. When so requested, no
enlisted person shall, without his consent, be tried by a court the membership
of which does not include enlisted persons to the number of at least one third
of the total membership of the court.3 9
The storm of protest following World War II, as we have seen, swept aside
one-hundred-seventy-three years of tradition; all-officer courts-martial were
no longer mandatory for enlisted accused in the Army or the Air Force. After
a short abatement, the tide of change was to arise again sweeping in front of
it this time one-hundred-seventy-six years of tradition-the tradition that
each individual service be governed by its own military justice code.
III.
THE UNIFORM CODE OF MILITARY JUSTIcE-ARTICLE 25
In 1948 the newly created Department of Defense decided to unify the sepa-
rate military justice codes40 of its subordinate departments into one Uniform
Many writers on military law in 1947-1948 supported enlisted membership for courts-
martial. See Berry, supra note 29, at 55; Comment, Military Justice: Changes Advised in
Courts-Martial System, 33 A.B.A.J. 40, 92 (1947); Holtzoff, Administration of Justice in the
United States Army, 22 N.Y.U.L.Q. REv. 1, 15 (1947); Wallstein, The Revision of the Army
Court-Martial System, 48 COLUM. L. REv. 219, 231 (1948); and Hickey and O'Neill, H.R.
2575, A Bill to Improve the Administration of Military Justice, 36 GEO. L.J. 614, 628 (1948).
Comment, Improving Military Justice: Advisory Committee's Report in Part Adopted,
33 A.B.A.J. 319, 321 (1947). Even Mr. Phillip McCook, who had conducted a study on behalf
of the War Department, 94 CONG. REc., 157 (1948), was not absolutely against enlisted mem-
bers on courts-martial. See Comment, 70 N.Y.S.B.A. 104, 109-111 (1947) and McCook, Reform
in Military Justice, 20 N.Y.S.B. BuLL. 66, 71 (1948).
87 H.R. RE.P. No. 1034, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 6 (1948).
1194 CONG. REc., 156-190 (1948).
'*Elston Act, 62 Stat. 604, 628 (1948).
40 At this time, the Army and Air Force were governed by the Articles of War, as amended,
by Title II of the Selective Service Act of 1948 (the Elston Act), Public Law 759, 80th Cong.,
62 Stat. 604. The Navy had separate Articles for the Government of the Navy found in REv.
STAT. § 1624, as amended by 10 Stat. 627 (1855), 35 Stat. 621 (1909) and 39 Stat. 586 (1916).
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Code of Military Justice. This Uniform Code was to be applicable to all per-
sonnel within the Department of Defense. A special committee4 was ap-
pointed to draft a recommended code to be submitted to the Congress. One
of the Committee's recommendations was to permit enlisted membership on
general and special courts-martial, 42 which, of course, was merely consistent
with the then current Army and Air Force military law.
When the proposed code reached the Congress, there was no opposition
to enlisted representation on courts-martial, although there were extended
discussions concerning the implementation of the proposed scheme. 4
As codified Article 25,4 4 Uniform Code of Military Justice, provides that
any enlisted member of an armed force on active duty is eligible to serve on
general and special courts-martial, except members of an accused's unit, and
those junior to the accused in rank or grade (when it can be avoided). En-
listed members are authorized only if the accused personally requests, in
writing, and before the convening of the court, that enlisted members serve.
After such a request an enlisted accused may not be tried unless one-third of
the court-martial's membership is enlisted, unless eligible enlisted members
cannot be obtained due to physical conditions or military exigencies. When
such conditions occur, and prevent enlisted membership on the court-mar-
tial, the convening authority must make a detailed written explanation which
becomes a part of the record of trial in the particular case. When selecting
enlisted members for court-martial duty, just as in the case of officers selected
for court duty, the convening authority is directed by the Code to detail those
members who, in his opinion, are best qualified for court-martial duty by
reason of age, education, training, experience, length of service, and judicial
temperament.
In comparing Article 25 of the Code with Article 4 of the Elston Act, one
can note several significant differences:
The Coast Guard was then governed by the Disciplinary Laws of the Coast Guard found in
Public Law 207, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., ch. 393, approved August 4, 1949, 14 U.S.C. § 563,
564 (1949). Neither the Navy nor the Coast Guard was authorized courts-martial, in part,
composed of enlisted members prior to the applicability of the Uniform Code of Military
Justice.
s The Chairman of this Committee was Professor Edmund M. Morgan, Jr., of the Harvard
Law School. Other members of the Committee were then Assistant Secretary of the Army
Gordon Gray, then Under Secretary of the Navy John Kenney, and then Assistant Secretary
of the Air Force Eugene Zuckert.
" The Elston Act provision permitting enlisted representation on courts-martial was
carried into the draft of the UNIFORM CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE, with minor changes. See S.
REP. No. 486, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., 14 (1949); H.R. REP. No. 491, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., 87-88
(1949).
Hearings before a Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee on H.R. 2498,
81st Cong., 1st Sess., at 602, 715, 723-724, 727, 1138-1141, and 1147-1152 (1949); Hearings be-
fore a Subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Committee on S. 857 and H.R. 4080, 81st
Cong., 1st Sess., 93-96 (1949).
"10 U.S.C. § 825 (1958).
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Article 4, Elston Act
I. "Enlisted persons ... shall be compe-
tent to serve on general and special courts-
martial ...." (emphasis added)
2. [Enlisted members must be]"... re-
quested in writing by the accused at any
time prior to the convening of the court."
3. "When so requested, no enlisted per-
son shall, without his consent, be tried by
a court the membership of which does not
include enlisted persons to the number of
at least one-third of the total membership
of the court." (emphasis added)
4. [Selection is by] ". . . age, training,
experience, and judicial temperament.
5. "... officers and enlisted persons hav-
ing less than two years' service shall not, if
it can be avoided without manifest injury
to the service, be appointed as members of
courts-martial ......
Article 25, UCMJ
1. "Any enlisted member . . . is eligible
to serve on general and special courts-
martial . . ." (emphasis added)
2. [An enlisted member] "... shall serve
as a member of a court only if, before the
convening of the court, the accused per-
sonally has requested in writing that en-
listed members serve on it." (emphasis
added)
3. "After such a request the accused may
not be tried . . . [unless there are] enlisted
members in a number comprising at least
one-third of the total membership of the
court, unless eligible enlisted members
cannot be obtained on account of physical
conditions or military exigencies." [If en-
listed members are unavailable, the con-
vening authority must provide a detailed
written explanation of their absence which
is appended to the record of trial in the
particular case.] (emphasis added)
4. [Selection is by] "... age, education,
training, experience, length of service, and
judicial temperament." (emphasis added)
5. No comparable provision.
THE CONVENING AuTHoRITY AND ENLISTED MEMBERS ON COURTS-MARTnAL
A. The selection of enlisted court members
In discussing the question of who should select enlisted court members, it is
necessary to distinguish between initial and ultimate selection. The law clear-
ly provides that only the convening authority personally may make the ulti-
mate selection of those enlisted members actually to participate in the trial.4 5
The convening authority of a general court-martial normally will com-
mand a division, corps, army or higher command. It is apparent that he will
be unable personally to prepare lists of prospective enlisted court members
and still fulfill his other important command duties. This is why normal
15 Art. 25 (d) (2), UNIFORM CODE OF MILrrARY JusTIcE [hereafter cited UCMJ], 10 U.S.C. §
825 (d) (2) (1948); CM 409319, Johnson, (30 Aug. 1963).
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staff procedure is utilized to secure the initial list of prospective enlisted
court members. In common practice, either the staff judge advocate or the
adjutant general of a command draws up a list of from eight to ten names of
enlisted members arranged in order of rank.4 6 From this list, which usually
only discloses the prospective member's name and rank, the convening au-
thority selects the court members.
The major defect in this system is that each command exercising general
court-martial jurisdiction has its own unique policy, or no policy, on how to
make this initial selection. It was just this policy, or lack of policy, which led
the convening authority in United States v. Barben,47 in selecting two E-8's
and one E-7 for the accused's court-martial, to choose enlisted members none
of whom was a graduate of the twelfth grade. Even more startling, in CM
409319, Johnson,4 8 the enlisted members were selected by a warrant officer
in the command. The list of prospective enlisted court members was never
presented to the convening authority. Examples like these are certain to arise
again unless a new policy is adopted to correct the present defects in selecting
enlisted members. (It should be noted that all of the defects applicable to
selecting enlisted members is equally applicable to the system used in selecting
officer court members).
B. How enlisted members should be selected for court service
One of the most desirable objectives of any change in policy would be the
creation of an Army-wide court-martial selection system designed to insure
that all pertinent information about prospective court-martial members is
provided to convening authorities prior to their ultimate selection of court
members. This system can be secured without Congressional action through
a departmental regulation which would set minimum standards for a gen-
eral court-martial selection policy. Unfortunately, neither the Manual For
Courts-Martial, United States, 1951, 41 nor the Uniform Code of Military Jus-
tice established a satisfactory selection system.
No regulation issued by the Department of the Army can take away the
individual commander's discretion to make the ultimate selection from what-
ever group he may lawfully select court members. It is not intended that a
regulation should even attempt to do this, for the Uniform Code of Military
Justice gives this discretion specifically to the court-martial convening au-
thority.50 Indeed, a commander's desire to select enlisted court members ei-
'wHearings before a Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Committee on
the Judiciary on S. Res. 260, 87th Cong., 2d Sess., 152-153 (1962); CM 410531, Glidden, (27
Feb. 1964), aff'd 15 USCMA 62, 35 CMR 34 (1964).
47 14 USCMA 198, 33 CMR 410 (1963), record Vol. 5, p. 6.
,1 CM 409319, Johnson (30 Aug. 1963).
"9 See MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL United States, 1951, para. 36 (c) (1) & (2). [Hereafter
cited MCM, 1951].
5" Art. 25 (d) (2), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 825 (d) (2) (1958).
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ther from the highest enlisted grades or from a cross-section of the enlisted
community is wholly irrelevant to the present discussion. For in either case
what is desired is selections of those members best qualified, and in order to
obtain this end, a new administration is recommended.
A departmental regulation should require that each general court-martial
jurisdiction assign one of the officers presently on the commander's staff the
responsibility of accomplishing functions similar to those of a civilian jury
commissioner (court-martial commissioner). This officer, in addition to per-
forming his regular duties, would be directed by the court-martial commis-
sioner regulation to keep lists of officers, warrant officers, and enlisted mem-
bers available for the staff judge advocate to present to the convening au-
thority when necessary. This initial selection would be made from any group
within the above three categories which the local commander desired, so
long as the selection is within minimum legal standards. Hence, it would be
possible to have variations in local selection systems depending upon the in-
dividual commander's exercise of discretion. The court-martial commissioner
system would not necessarily broaden the base of any group from which en-
listed members are selected. Rather, its primary function would be to pro-
vide every commander with sufficient information to insure that in the exer-
cise of his discretion he may select only those members who are best qualified
whatever base of selection is employed.
The initial selection lists presently utilized provide convening authorities
with only the prospective member's name and rank in most cases. The fol-
lowing additional information about each prospective court member should
be provided, as a minimum, on such lists: (1) age; (2) educational attain-
ment; (3) training generally and in military justice; (4) experience gen-
erally and any court-martial experiences; (5) length of service; and (6)
comments by the prospective member's immediate commanding officer (ex-
cept where the convening authority is that officer and thus the comment
would be unnecessary) regarding the member's temperamental suitability
for court-martial duty.
The procedure suggested would be nothing more than an administrative
method of making available to the convening authority in usable form that
information about prospective court members which would be logically rele-
vant to him in following the guidelines established by the Code in this area.
It would in no sense limit or otherwise affect the convening authority's exer-
cise of discretion, but would merely make available to him in a systematized
way pertinent information about prospective court members.
C. When enlisted members should be selected
By creating the position of court-martial commissioner on the commander's
staff, the command would have an officer responsible for maintaining con-
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tinuously lists of court members, officers and enlisted. These lists should be
kept current at all times so they could be available for immediate use.51 This
would prevent the usual embarrassment which arises when an accused re-
quests enlisted members for his court-martial shortly before the court-martial
is to convene.
52
D. Which enlisted members should be selected for court service
1. General rules.
Commissioned officers are qualified to be members of any court-martial.5 3
Warrant officers are qualified, except to participate in the trial of a commis-
sioned officer,54 while enlisted members are qualified only after they are re-
quested by an enlisted accused. 55 Whether the members of a court-martial are
officers or enlisted, they may not be selected in a manner which might deny
a fair trial to an accused.56 The trial counsel may not participate in the court
member selection process because this tends to destroy the adversary nature
of the criminal proceedings. 57 This rule is, of course, in accord with civilian
law in this area. 58
11 The court-martial commissioner could keep additional information in his files, such as
prospective court member's departure dates from the command pursuant to permanent
orders, TDY orders, and other pertinent information which might affect prospective court-
martial member's availability to perform court-martial duty. This would make the Army
system more nearly resemble the system used in selecting socalled "blue ribbon" juries in
New York. In the New York system, the special panel, or "blue ribbon" panel, is a part of
the regular judicial machinery, and is not brought into existence from case to case. See Fay
v. New York, 332 U.S. 261, 268 (1947).
6This very thing occurred in United States v. Crawford, 15 USCMA 31, 35 CMR 3 (1964),
motion for leave to file petition for cert. denied, 380 U.S. 970 (1965). Both the staff judge ad-
vocate and the convening authority were still seeking out eligible enlisted members the eve-
ning before the morning on which the court-martial was to convene. As to when it is neces-
sary to have the court-martial composed of one-third enlisted members, compare MCM,
1951, para. 61g with WC NCM 58-01534, Rendon, 27 CMR 844 (1958).
51MCM, 1951, para. 4a; art. 25 (a), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 825 (a) (1958). Indeed, absent
evidence of prejudgment of the accused's case, a court-martial trying a colored accused may
be composed of "senior officers" who are predominantly "southerners." CM 360557, Bryson,
10 CMR 164, 171 (1952), petition for review denied, 3 USCMA 814, 10 CMR 159 (1953). But
see, Art. 25 (d) (1), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 825 (d) (1) (1958) which provides that neither com-
missioned officers, warrant officers, nor enlisted members should be permitted on a court-
martial to try an accused senior in rank or grade to the member, if it can be avoided.
61MCM, 1951, para. 4a; art. 25 (b), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 825 (b) (1958).
MMCM, 1951, para. 4a; art. 25 (c), 25 (c), (1), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 825 (c) (1) (1958).
1 United States v. Hedges, 11 USCMA 642, 29 CMR 458 (1960); Cf. United States v. Sears,
6 USCMA 661, 20 CMR 377 (1956).
57ACM 8501-R, Cook, 18 CMR 715 (1955). But see, ACM 10226, Sax, 19 CMR 826, 837-839
(1954), petition for review denied, 6 USCMA 822, 19 CMR 413 (1955). This case permits a
trial counsel to initiate a request for court-martial members, but limits permissible conduct
to purely administrative action, and prohibits the trial counsel from selecting any of the
court members.
I United States v. Murphy, 224 Fed. 554 (N.D.N.Y. 1915); Patrick v. Commonwealth, 115
Va. 933, 78 S.E. 628 (1913).
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2. Enlisted member selection
While Article 25 (c) (1), Uniform Code of Military Justice, 9 makes any en-
listed member on active duty eligible to serve on general and special courts-
martial, experience shows that usually only senior enlisted members actually
serve on general courts-martial.60
This practice was challenged by the author, then acting as appellate de-
fense counsel for the accused, in the case of United States v. Crawford.61 The
accused claimed that otherwise eligible enlisted members had been inten-
tionally and systematically excluded, on an Army-wide basis, from participa-
tion in general courts-martial, and the effect of this exclusion as applied to
the accused's case deprived him of military due process. Although the United
States Court of Military Appeals, with one Judge dissenting, rejected the ac-
cused's contentions, certain important rules were set forth concerning the
selection of enlisted members for courts-martial service. Three opinions were
written in this case, and they will be discussed seriatim.
Chief Judge Quinn, whose opinion constitutes the Court's decision, while
recognizing that servicemen do not have the protection of indictment by
grand jury or trial by petit jury, would accord to them all constitutional
rights not plainly denied them as military accused. One of these rights is to
be treated equally with all other accused in the selection of impartial triers
of the facts. All enlisted members are eligible for court-martial service, and
any blanket exclusion would be unlawful, whether accomplished by the con-
vening authority making an ultimate selection or by a staff officer making an
initial selection. Some junior enlisted members would meet the statutory
qualifications 2 for selection, but substantial preliminary screening would be
necessary in order to find them. Hence it is permissible to select enlisted
court-martial members from the highest non-commissioned officer ranks first
(E-7 to E-9),63 when the only reason in looking to these higher non-commis-
10 U.S.C. § 825 (c) (1) (1958).
10 For similar views, see Mullally, Military Justice: The Uniform Code in Action, 53 Co-
LUM. L. REv. 18 (1953); as of December 1964, the same was true of the Air Force. Comment,
Current Trends in Military Criminal Law, 6 AF JAG L. REV. 13, 15 (Nov.-Dec. 1964),
6 15 USCMA 31, 35 CMR 3 (1964), motion for leave to file petition for cert. denied, 380
U.S. 970 (1965). The author wishes to gratefully acknowledge the legal and statistical re-
search done by co-counsel, Captain Daniel Benson, in Crawford, since it constitutes a source
of information relied upon in this paper. See also United States v. Motley, 15 USCMA 61,
35 CMR 33 (1964) and United States v. Glidden, 15 USCMA 62, 35 CMR 34 (1964).
Another issue involved the intentional inclusion of a Negro enlisted court member. Federal
law appears to be in conflict in this area. Compare Collins v. Walker, 329 F. 2d 100 (5th Cir.
1964), cert. denied, (U.S. No. 407, Nov. 9, 1964), with United States v. Dennis, 183 F. 2d 201,
223 (2d Cir. 1950), afj'd, 341 U.S. 494 (1951) and Dow v. Carnegie-Ill. Steel Corp., 224 F. 2d
414, 425-426 (3rd Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 971 (1955).
11 15 USCMA 3 at 40, 35 CMR 3 at 12. These qualifications are "... age, education, train-
ing, experience, length of service, and judicial temperament." See Art. 25 (d) (2), UCMJ, 10
U.S.C. § 825 (d) (2) (1958).
1 Thus excluding all specialists of whatever grade, as was admittedly done in the Crawford
case.
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sioned officer ranks is to find persons possessed of proper qualifications to
judge and sentence an accused.
Judge Kilday believed that civilian cases concerning jury selection are in-
applicable to a court-martial selection system. For Judge Kilday, trial by
court-martial is trial by one's superiors, not by one's peers. 64 He believed that
the Congress was aware that senior enlisted members would be used by the
services, and also that a convening authority in faithfully exercising his dis-
cretion in selecting enlisted members would naturally select those most re-
sponsible which, in most cases-although not necessarily-would be those
who had attained seniority.
Judge Ferguson, in dissent, considered the issue so fundamental that it
must be treated as jurisdictional in nature. After determining, much like
Chief Judge Quinn, that all enlisted members were eligible for court-martial
service, he noted that for the period 1959 to 1962, an average of 89.4 per cent
of all enlisted court-martial members in general courts-martial in the Army
were selected from the top three enlisted grades-E-7, E-8, and E9. He found
that "[T] he statistics cited [by the accused] show that in the Army there is a
'systematic and intentional exclusion' from ... court lists ..."65 Judge Fergu-
son, therefore, would have ordered a new trial.
As a matter of literal interpretation, under the Crawford decision a com-
mand could select its enlisted court members from the top three non-com-
missioned officer grades, excluding all specialists, and make no further in-
quiry into the qualifications of the members thus selected. This would be
too narrow a reading of Crawford, however. Great caution should be exer-
cised in this area since the rationale of the Court's decision in the Crawford
case is subject to attack as representing a radical departure from modern
federal law. This departure must be explored in some detail in order to ex-
tract reliable guides for future cases from Crawford.
The United States Court of Military Appeals has repeatedly held that
federal practice should be followed in the military unless it is contrary to,
or incompatible with, military law.66 Thus, while conformity of practice is
not duplication of practice, it was to be expected, in Crawford, that the court
would follow federal precedent in the area of jury selection. Certainly a
court-martial is not a jury, and the comparison of one with the other can be
e, Trial by peers is allowed by the Code, however; it is trial by juniors that is prohibited.
For example, if an E-8 were on trial, all E-8's with an equal or earlier date of rank would be
authorized to participate as members of the court-martial. Certainly this is trial by one's
peers. Conversely, all E-8's with a later date of rank, and all enlisted personnel below the
grade of E-8, would not be authorized to participate as members of the court-martial if that
could be avoided.
15 USCMA at 57,35 CMR at 29.
1 United States v. Baker, 14 USCMA 311, 34 CMR 91 (1963); United States v. Jacks, 8
USCMA 574, 576, 25 CMR 78, 80 (1958); United States v. Fisher, 4 USCMA 152, 15 CMR 152
(1954).
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deceptive if this fact is not recognized. But having recognized the difference,
it is at once apparent that there are many similarities; both tribunals find
facts, determine guilt or innocence, and in some instances, juries fix punish-
ments,67 as do courts-martial. The analytical generic problems involved in
determining whether exclusion of eligible members during selection proce-
dures was intentional, systematic, or arbitrary, are the same in the military
as in civilian law. But the United States Court of Military Appeals did not
follow federal law at that point where it was most applicable: in the analysis
of the generic problems of exclusion. Suprisingly enough, while the court
indicated a readiness to follow some of the federal principles involved, it
did not adopt the working tests utilized by the federal courts in resolving
the generic problems. This is demonstrated by an examination of the federal
rules in the area of jury selection.
First, as to the general legal principles involved, the applicable rules may
be broadly stated as follows: (1) an accused is not entitled to any particular
kind of jury; (2) an accused has no right of inclusion on the panel of any
person or class of persons; but, (3) an accused is entitled to a fair and im-
partial jury drawn from a panel from which no class of eligible persons was
systematically, arbitrarily, and purposefully excluded solely because of mem-
bership in that class, or prejudice against that class, as determined by con-
siderations of race, color, sex, party affiliation, social status, economic condi-
tion, or any other consideration which is irrelevant to the performance of
jury duty.68 These rules 69 were developed in a long line of cases 70 by the
Supreme Court of the United States, and they are now applied.
In determining how and when to apply these rules, the Supreme Court of
the United States looks at the facts to reach the generic problems involved:
was there exclusion, and if so, what was its scope and purpose? General asser-
tions of regularity by the officials involved are rejected when a prima facie
0 In Texas, for example, the jury determines the sentence in many instances. See VERNON'S
TEXAS CODE OF CRIM. PRO. arts. 502, 778 (1964).
Is Exclusion of certain well-defined classes on bona fide grounds of community welfare is
not prohibited, such as judges, attorneys, police officers, ministers, firemen, and physicians
as some examples. See, 50 C.J.S. Juries § 153 (1947); 31 Am. Jur. Jury § 68 (1958). Nor is
exclusion of the type practiced in New York for "blue ribbon" juries prohibited, since
classes are not excluded there, but individuals and the exclusion is based on factors that are
relevant to jury duty. See, Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 261, 268-270 (1947).
6Judge Kilday conceded the correctness of this formulation and statement of the rules in
the Crawford case. 15 USCMA at 48. 35 CMR at 20.
70Stauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880); Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313 (1880);
Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S. 370 (1881); Bush v. Kentucky, 103 U.S. 110 (1883); Gibson v.
Mississippi, 162 U.S. 565 (1896); Carter v. Texas, 177 U.S. 442 (1900); Rawlins v. Georgia,
201 U.S. 638 (1906); Thomas v. Texas, 212 U.S. 278 (1909); Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587
(1935); Hale v. Kentucky, 303 U.S. 613 (1938); Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128 (1940); Glasser
v. United States, 315 U.S. 827 (1942); Hill v. Texas, 316 U.S. 400 (1942); Akins v. Texas, 325
U.S. 398 (1945); Thiel v. Southern Pacific Co., 328 U.S. 217 (1946); Ballard v. United States,
329 U.S. 187 (1946); Patton v. Mississippi, 332 U.S. 463 (1947), Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S.
475 (1954); Kubanks v. Louisiana, 356 U.S. 584 (1958).
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case of exclusion is made out.71 A showing of exclusion over a long period of
time of substantial portions of the population results in application of the
Supreme Court's "rule of exclusion" doctrine, which is available in supply-
ing proof of discrimination against any delineated class.72 When a prima facie
case of exclusion is made out, the government must come forward with evi-
dence to contradict such a showing if it is to prevail.7 3 Also, the selecting au-
thorities cannot be heard to say that they practiced exclusion inadvertently
through ignorance. 74 It is unnecessary to show prejudice. 75
The United States Court of Military Appeals did not follow the analytical
rules enumerated immediately above, although it tacitly accepted the fed-
eral rules prohibiting blanket exclusion on an arbitrary basis. Intentional
exclusion of a substantial portion of the military community (all specialists
of whatever grade, and all other enlisted members who were not in the top
three non-commissioned officer grades) was admitted by the personnel who
made the initial selection of names for the prospective court member list in
the Crawford case. Even so, the United States Court of Military Appeals did
not find that a showing of unlawful exclusion had been made by the accused.
The conclusion is inescapable that the Supreme Court of the United States
would have applied its analytical rules differently in a jury selection case.
Since Crawford deviates from modern federal law in the analogous area of
jury selection, and since there was a concurring opinion and a vigorous dis-
sent, it would appear that a command would be well advised to avoid selec-
tion policies more narrow than those sanctioned in the Crawford case.
If a command were to limit its enlisted selectees to the grade of E-9, this
would probably be unlawful. At least that result is intimated by Chief Judge
Quinn in United States v. Mitchell.76 It might be lawful to select only E-8's
and E-9's, but such a policy would be unwise. Although selection from the
top three non-commissioned officer enlisted grades has been specifically ap-
proved by a majority of the United States Court of Military Appeals, cer-
tainly no selections should ever be made from a more restricted group, par-
ticularly in view of the court's deviation from modem federal law and a
vigorous dissent, in Crawford, as discussed above.
This does not mean, of course, that a command could not or should not
have a broader enlisted selection system. A much better system could easily
be attained if each general court-martial command had a court-martial com-
71 Norris v. Alabama, supra note 70 at 598-599.
71 Norris v. Alabama, supra note 70; Hernandez v. Texas, supra note 70 at 480.
" Pierre v. Louisiana, 306 U.S. 354, 361-362 (1939); Hernandez v. Texas, supra note 70 at
480.
74 Hill v. Texas, supra note 70 at 400-404.
75 Thiel v. Southern Pacific Co., supra note 70 at 225.
" 15 USCMA 59, 60, 35 CMR 31, 32 (1964); Cf. United States v. Freeman, 15 USCMA 128,
35 CMR 98 (1964).
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missioner responsible for initially selecting court-martial members. This offi-
cial could do the substantial preliminary screening of lower grade enlisted
members, spoken of by Chief Judge Quinn, so that those with the proper
individual qualifications could be selected for court-martial service. In this
manner, a large segment of the enlisted military community, now unrepre-
sented on our courts-martial, could be accorded fair and democraic repre-
sentation.
3. Ineligible enlisted members
a.) Enlisted members from the accused's unit. Any enlisted member selected
for service on an accused's court-martial must be from a unit other than the
accused's unit.77 Before the Uniform Code of Military Justice, the statutory
limitation provided that a member could not be assigned to the accused's
unit.78 This was held to apply only to those members formally assigned to
the unit; one could be present in the unit in an attached or other status and
not be formally assigned to the unit, and therefore unit personnel could be
eligible court members.
79
The same result has been reached by a Navy Board of Review under the
Uniform Code of Military Justice. In NCM 329, Cook, the accused was as-
signed to a naval receiving station only for the purposes of trial.8 0 He re-
quested and received enlisted members for his court-martial, three of whom
were provided from the enlisted population of the receiving station. None
of these members was a member of the accused's unit at the time of the com-
misson of the alleged offense, so the issue presented on appeal was whether
these enlisted members and the accused were members of the same unit at
the time of the trial. The Board held implicitly that the receiving station was
composed of more than one unit. It found that personnel temporarily as-
signed for administrative convenience, like the accused, composed one unit,
while permanent party personnel composed another wholly separate unit.
Therefore, the court members were not from the same unit as the accused,
and they could lawfully participate in his court-martial. This decision is sub-
ject to criticism, however, as in fact the receiving station, as far as adminis-
tration was concerned, comprised one unit only. Hence the Board seems to
have created units for judicial purposes, thus exercising a power probably
not possessed by a Board of Review.
An Army Board of Review reached a contrary, and much more sound, re-
7 Art. 25 (c) (1), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 825 (c) (1) (1958). This was to prevent ill feeling in
a unit and also to assure selection of individuals free of bias or prejudice either for or against
an accused. For a definition of "unit", see Article 25 (c) (2), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 825 (c) (2)
(1958).
7
8 Art. of War 16, as amended, 41 Stat. 787 (1920).
CM 335865, Quimbo, 2 BR-JC 297 (1949).
8 NCM 329, Cook, 16 CMR 404 (1954).
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sult in CM 398315, Scott.81 The accused was assigned to the 24th Military
Police Company, 24th Infantry Division, at the time of the alleged offense.
Because of a reorganization, this company became the 15th Administrative
Company of the 1st Cavalry Division, a unit containing over 1,000 personnel.
Although the accused was assigned, by a local commander, to a "provisional"
sub-unit of the 15th Administrative Company, the Board of Review would
not recognize this locally created "provisional" unit for court-martial pur-
poses. It held that any enlisted member from the 15th Administrative Com-
pany was from the same unit as the accused.
To date there has been no definitive decision, either by the Court of Mili-
tary Appeals or by service Boards of Review, as to when disability for court-
martial service attaches to the members of an accused's unit. Is a potential
court member ineligible if he was in the accused's unit at the time of the of-
fense, but not at the time of trial? Is there a different result in the case of a
potential court member who joins the accused's unit after the offense but be-
fore trial? The critical question of precisely when an individual is or is not a
member of another's unit, for court-martial purposes, remains unanswered.
The way to avoid difficulty in this area is to select individuals for court-mar-
tial service who are not members of the accused's unit either at the time of
the alleged commission of the crime charged, or at the time of trial.
b.) Enlisted members junior to the accused. Article 25 (d) (1), Uniform
Code of Military Justice, 82 reads: "When it can be avoided, no member of an
armed force may be tried by a court-martial any member of which is junior
to him in rank or grade." This provision, of course, applies to officers as well
as to enlisted members. It was formerly a recognized custom in the Army to
compose a court-martial of one's superiors, and it was therefore generally
assumed that one's equals or juniors would not participate. Judge Kilday
called this provision of the Code "The first clear and positive direction to
the convening authority in appointing a court-martial ....83
Certainly, if it becomes necessary to compose a court-martial with mem-
bers junior to the accused, this can be done lawfully. But the convening au-
thority should make a detailed written statement explaining that his action
was taken because of justifiable physical conditions or military exigencies. A
copy of this explanation should be appended to the record of trial.84
CM 398315, Scott, 25 CMR 636 (1957).
10 U.S.C. § 825 (d) (1) (1958).
United States v. Crawford, 15 USCMA 31, 47, 35 CMR 3, 19 (1964). In so doing, however,
he erroneously interpreted the Code. The Code does not exclude those of equal rank or
grade; they may serve. It only excludes juniors, and there is a significant difference; mani-
festly one's equals in rank or grade are in that sense one's peers.
"Cf. Art. 25 (c) (1), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 825 (c) (1) (1958).
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4. Accused who are not entitled to enlisted members.
a.) Discharged former enlisted members. In order for enlisted members to
serve on a court-martial, there must be a request for such members by an
enlisted accused. In a recent Air Force case, a discharged former enlisted
member serving confinement pursuant to a prior court-martial conviction
requested enlisted members to serve on his court-martial. His request was
denied. On appeal, this action was held to be correct as there is no authority
in law to allow enlisted participation, except in the trial of other enlisted
members.85
b.) Civilians. In time of peace, civilians will not be a military justice prob-
lem for the military lawyer.8 6 But in time of war civilians being tried by
court-martial may seek to have the tribunal's membership contain other ci-
vilians or enlisted members. There is no authority for this in military law.
Civilians may be tried by all-officer tribunals.
8 7
V.
THE TRIAL DEFENSE COUNSEL AND ENLISTED MEMBERS ON COURTS-MARTIAL
A. Advice that must be given to an enlisted accused.
Of the many duties88 which a trial defense counsel is obligated to perform be-
fore, during, and after trial by court-martial, none is more important than
advising an enlisted accused of his right to request enlisted representation
on his court-martial. Counsel for the accused is commanded to do this by the
Manual For Courts-Martial, United States, 1951. 89
Minimal advice also includes the information that the right to request or
not request enlisted members to serve on his court-martial is personal, and
involves a decision which the accused must make personally.90 The accused
must be informed that he is free to make his decision in this regard at any
sACM 18035, Ragan, 32 CMR 913 (1962), aff'd, 14 USCMA 119, 33 CMR 331 (1963).
, Civilians, in time of peace, are not subject to court-martial jurisdiction. Reid v. Covert,
345 U.S. 1 (1957); McElroy v. Guagliardo, 361 U.S. 281 (1960).
I ACM 7031, Covert, 16 CMR 465 (1954), rev'd, 6 USCMA 48, 19 CMR 174 (1955). Later
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
" For a concise summary of these duties, see MCM, 1951, para. 48.
11 MCM, 1951, para. 48e reads, in part: "Before the trial he [trial defense counsel] will
advise an accused enlisted person of his right to have enlisted persons as members of the
court." (Emphasis added). Correct advice to an enlisted accused would require substituting
"request" for "have" in the quoted portion of para. 48e. Under certain circumstances, a con-
vening authority can deny enlisted membership in an accused's court-martial for "physical
conditions" or "military exigencies". See, Art. 25 (c) (1), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 825 (c) (1)
(1958).
0 Art. 25 (c) (c), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 825 (c) (1) (1958). See Chapter III of this paper,
infra. where Article 4 of the Elston Act is compared with the language of Article 25, UCMJ.
There item 2 points out the specific change in the language of the UCMJ which requires the
accused to "personally" request enlisted members for his court-martial. This change in lan-
guage was intentional, and not a mere oversight. See Hearings on H.R. 2498 before a Sub-
committee of the House Committee on Armed Services, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., 1147 (1949). See
also, MCM, 1951, para. 48e.
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time before the convening of the court-martial9 ' (although for obvious rea-
sons, an accused should be strongly persuaded to elect for or against an en-
listed court-martial well in advance, so that amending orders and changes in
personnel can be efficiently effected). Counsel should point out to the accused,
by reference to the Guide to Trial Procedure,92 the point at which a
court-martial is deemed to be convened.93 And he should make it very clear
that subsequent to this time, the accused no longer has any right to demand
enlisted representation on his court-martial.
B. Additional advice which should be given to an enlisted accused.
The Congress, in changing the Elston Act, unfortunately decided to require
enlisted accused to decide personally whether or not to request enlisted mem-
bers to serve on their courts-martial. The reason given for this change was
to prevent any enlisted accused from requesting enlisted court members
through counsel and thereafter complaining about the conduct of the en-
listed membership after conviction and sentence.
94
The results of this Congressional policy, however, have been detrimental
to enlisted accused. Because counsel defending enlisted accused have been
deprived of most of their necessary freedom of decision to select or reject en-
listed members on courts-martial, many have tended to inform an accused
only of his right to enlisted representation and no more.95 Thus many ac-
cused, especially the young and unsophisticated, must make an important le-
gal decision in their trial without really effective assistance of counsel in this
area.
Only trial defense counsel can correct this grave deficiency. This can be
done by conscientious counsel using all available information regarding the
type of case involved to determine whether it is beneficial or detrimental to
have enlisted members participate. This information can be obtained from
senior judge advocate general's corps officers who have had substantial trial
experience, from statistical studies compiled by the Records Control and
Analysis Branch, United States Army Judiciary, and from counsel's own ex-
perience. This information should be passed on to the accused so that he can
91 Art. 25 (c) (1), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 825 (c) (1958).
02 MCM, 1951, app. 8a at 504.
reId. at para. 61g. Of course, in actual practice such requests will, and should, be made
sufficiently in advance of trial to permit the convening authority to name enlisted members
to the court-martial. However, occasionally an accused will request enlisted members at the
last moment. Normally, this would occur in cases where the trial defense counsel failed to
advise an enlisted accused of his right to request enlisted members.
", Hearings on H.R. 2498 before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on Armed Serv-
ices, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., 1147 (1949).
95 The author's survey of trial defense counsel indicates some defense counsel do not inform
accused of their right to enlisted members at all. Others merely inform an accused of this
right, but do not comment upon the desirability or undesirability of having enlisted mem-
bers, while others do both.
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make an intelligent election in requesting or rejecting enlisted participation
in his court-martial.
Another important consideration for an enlisted accused, who requests
enlisted members to serve on his court-martial, is the knowledge that his re-
quest may be denied. The accused should be prepared for this by being in-
formed that a convening authority can deny such a request under certain
physical conditions or military exigencies.9 6 Appellate defense counsel would
have a duty to test any such denial of enlisted members, on appeal, since the
denial is a reviewable issue.9 7 In this connection, the facts should be developed
at trial, and a proper foundation laid both by the Government and the de-
fense, in order to preserve the matter for appeal.
C. Ethics and the severance problem.
1.) The request.
In a joint or common trial of accused, defense counsel often seek severances.
If the charges preferred against separate accused are not closely related,98 or
if an accused desires to use testimony from his co-accused, or his wife, or if
his co-accused's defense is antagonistic to his own, or if the evidence which
is to be presented by a co-accused is prejudicial, then good cause can be shown
for a severance. 99
Lawyers also desire severances for other reasons which the law has not
deemed important enough to merit such relief. These reasons might include
a lawyer's personal desire to exercise complete control over the case as the
only attorney involved; the lawyer's fear of so-called substantial justice, where
a co-accused is found not guilty, while the lawyer's client is found guilty be-
cause the latter had the worst record of the two accused, and the court-mar-
tial wanted to appear fair; or the fear that in sentencing, the court-martial
will unfavorably compare the accused's bad record with the co-accused's
good record, thereby harshly sentencing the accused rather than applying
These exceptions to the enlisted member requirement are other changes from the Elston
Act. See Chapter III, item 3, of this paper, infra, comparing Article 4 of the Elston Act with
Article 25, UCMJ. In making the enlisted provisions of the Elston Act which applied only to
the Army and the Air Force, applicable to the Navy and the Coast Guard, some provision
was needed to allow trials without enlisted participation for courts-martial on ships at sea
and remote weather stations ashore, when eligible enlisted members were unavailable. See,
Hearings on H.R. 2498 before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on Armed Services,
81st Cong., 1st Sess. 1150-1151 (1949). In time of peace, denial of enlisted participation should
be rare, and generally limited to the naval services. The test to be applied is sustaining or
overruling the denial of enlisted members by the convening authority is simply, did the
convening authority act reasonably under all of the facts and circumstances of the particular
case? CGCM 20629, Rivera, 24 CMR 519, 521 (1957); LEGAL AND LEGISLATIVE BASIS, MANUAL
FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, 1951, 22 (1951).
MMCM, 1951, para. 4c.
'Id. at para. 331.
90d. at para. 69d. See United States v. Bodenheimer 2 USCMA 130, 7 CMR 6 (1953).
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general sentence standards to him. 00 Whatever the reasons, it is very common
for defense counsel to desire these severances.
When the accused are enlisted, whether good reasons or no reasons are
present to justify a severance, one can be obtained automatically by merely
having one of the enlisted accused request enlisted members for his court-
martial. In taking such action, however, many lawyers may hesitate and pon-
der over the ethics of their conduct. Any hesitation, in the author's opinion,
is completely unnecessary. After all, the right to enlisted members on his
court-martial is a fundamental right of an enlisted accused, subject only to
very limited exceptions, and the Manual For Courts-Martial, United States,
1951, explicitly contemplates the use of that right to obtain severances. The
Manual drafters specifically provided, that in joint and common trials,
"... an enlisted person [may] make an individual request that the member-
ship of the court include enlisted persons .... 101 When this action is taken,
the request must be treated as if it were a granted motion to sever,10 2 and this
requires the court-martial to decide which accused will be tried first, and
which will have his case deferred. The trial counsel, of course, must report
this action to the convening authority at once.'03 Since the original drafters
contemplated that enlisted accused would use their right to enlisted trial
participation as a severance device, and since an accused has a right to re-
quest enlisted representation for no reason, or for any reason, it is perfectly
proper to advise an enlisted accused to request enlisted court members for
the sole purpose of securing a severance.
2.) The withdrawal.
Let us assume, for the sake of discussion, that two enlisted accused have been
brought before a general court-martial in a common or joint trial. One ac-
cused has requested, and the convening authority has granted, enlisted par-
ticipation, thereby severing the trials of the two accused. The accused de-
siring an all-officer court-martial is immediately tried, while the other ac-
cused's trial is deferred. The accused who requested enlisted participation
did so on the advice of counsel solely in order to obtain a severance. He is
now being brought to trial before a court-martial, one-third of which is com-
posed of enlisted members. At this stage, whether the accused's legal counsel
may ethically advise him to withdraw the request for enlisted members, there-
101 Even if one accused has a good record vis-a-vis his co-accused, there is no assurance that
the difference will be reflected in the sentences actually imposed, and unfavorable results can
follow the gamble involved in obtaining a severance by requesting an enlisted court. This
did occur in CM 410853, Gallagher, 11 June 1964, petition for review denied, 15 January 1965
(No. 18,212).
0 MCM, 1951, para. 53c.
102Id. at para. 61g.
'13 Id. at para. 69d.
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by obtaining the benefits of a severance, and avoiding trial by enlisted mem-
bers too, is a problem which is being faced more and more often.
This problem is complicated somewhat by a 1952 administrative ruling
permitting a fully-advised accused to insert in writing at the formal court-
martial proceedings a withdrawal of a prior written request for enlisted mem-
bers.104 This ruling, however, did not contemplate a case such as here posited,
but rather one where an accused, who requested enlisted members because
he actually desired trial by them, changed his mind before trial, and where
no severance, or other benefit, was obtained incidentally.
A lawyer's duty to vigorously defend his client may not extend to the point
where his conduct lacks candor and fairness to the court-martial. 05 Nor may
the attorney allow his client to act in a manner which would be unethical
were the attorney acting 0G Necessarily, asking for enlisted members to ob-
tain a severance entails, or should entail, a balancing of the benefit of the
automatic severance thereby obtained against any detriment, real or fancied,
flowing from enlisted participation. Ethically, the attorney must decide in
advance which will be the best choice of action, and having elected a course
of conduct, remain steadfastly to it unless a change of circumstances requires
some alteration of tactics. While there is no explicit authority in the Uniform
Code of Military Justice107 pertaining to a withdrawal of an enlisted member
request, certainly adherence to the administrative decision allowing it re-
quires that the request should not be withdrawn after the benefit of sever-
ance has been obtained, except in the most unusual circumstances. This
would be especially true where one co-accused has already been tried, after
severance, and a joint or common trial such as would have been had in the
absence of the request for an enlisted court is no longer possible. In other
words, an accused cannot have his cake and eat it too; if severance is secured
through a request for an enlisted court, and if that was the sole purpose for
the request, then the accused must submit to trial by such a court.
VI.
THE LAW OFFICER AND ENLISTED MEMBERS ON COURTS-MARTIAL
A. The law officer should give advice to an enlisted accused.
It is apparent that as drafted, the Manual For Courts-Martial, United States,
1951 did not place any burden upon law officers to advise enlisted accused of
their right to enlisted membership on courts-martial. The law officer was
- JAGJ 1952/6970 (11 Sept. 1952). An accused could not merely waive enlitsed representa-
tion. He must insert into the record a formal written withdrawal.
10 American Bar Association, Canons of Professional Ethics, Canon 22.
11 Id. at Canon 16.
'°MArt. 25 (c), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 825 (c) (1958).
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merely required to ask the trial counsel if the accused was requesting in writ-
ing that enlisted members participate. The trial counsel replied, appropri-
ately, that the accused was or was not, and then the court-martial was con-
vened.' 08
This procedure is inadequate today. In United States v. Parker,1o9 appel-
lant alleged that he had never been advised by counsel of his right to request
enlisted members to serve on his court-martial. This claim was not refuted
by his trial defense counsel. The United States Court of Military Appeals
noted that a request for enlisted members must be made in writing prior to
the convening of the court-martial, but if an accused was never advised of
his right, failure to do this would not constitute a waiver. The court, speak-
ing through Judge Latimer, stated that ".... if an accused in the lower intel-
ligence bracket is not informed [of his right to enlisted members], the in-
court discussion would hardly put him on notice that he had waived a
right.""x 0 This case also contained many other serious errors, and in reversing
the court relied upon all of the errors.'
Manifestly then, it is wise for the law officer to advise the enlisted accused
in open court of his right to enlisted court members. Although not all law
officers in the Army do this, that service's official position appears to require
it."12
B. When an accused requests further advice.
An enlisted accused must decide personally whether or not he desires en-
listed members to serve on his court-martial. Let us assume that the accused,
a private, has consulted with his legally qualified defense counsel. Counsel
has advised11 3 against enlisted participation because it is his opinion, under
the facts and circumstances of the case, that enlisted court members will be
unsympathetic to the accused.
At the trial, the accused informs the law officer that he has been advised
to forego enlisted court members, but also that this must be his personal de-
cision. When he asked counsel to furnish facts from which he could deter-
mine whether enlisted court members were beneficial or not, he was inform-
ed none was available. He has discussed this issue with each judge advocate
officer in the command associated with the defense, and in each instance he
failed to acquire sufficient information from which he could make an intel-
ligent election in favor of or against enlisted court participation. He now
'MMCM, 1951, app. 8a at 504.
'°6 USCMA 75, 19 CMR 201 (1955).110 d at 86, 19 CMR at 211.
" Id. at 89, 19 CMR at 214.
U.S. Dep't of Army Pamphlet, No. 27-9, The Law Officer 12 (2 ed. 30 April 1958).
"' Pursuant to U.S. Dep't of Army Pamphlet, No. 27-10, The Trial Counsel and The De-
fense Counsel 76 (2d ed. 1962).
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desires the law officer to advise him on the merits or demerits of enlisted
court membership. While there is apparently no authority precisely in
point, general considerations regarding the law officer's role and status per-
mit the formulation of certain guidelines.
The law officer should hold an out-of-court hearing immediately. The ac-
cused should be advised, on the record, that the law officer has access to very
little information which would provide an answer to his question, and that
normally an accused can rely upon the advice of his counsel as being sound.
The law officer should give his personal opinion favoring or opposing en-
listed court members in the particular case only if requested to do so by the
accused or defense counsel, and state the reasons therefor, explaining that
this advice is not binding upon the accused nor need it be accepted by him.
The accused should then be given sufficient time to consider this advice, and
consult again with his counsel, before he is required to make his decision.
VII.
EXPERIENCE UNDER ARTICLE 25, UNIFORM CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE
A. When and why enlisted members have been requested.
One who desires to study enlisted member participation on courts-martial
will quickly find that there is a dearth of information on the subject. There
are many rumors, however, from those beginning in the legislative history of
the Uniform Code of Military Justice itself, such as the statement "... some
of these 'crusty' noncoms might throw the book at these boys. ..",114 to cur-
rent rumors present in many Army judge advocate offices, which when stated
sound like this: "don't ever, under any circumstances request enlisted mem-
bers on any court-martial; they will be quick to convict and then they will
render a harsh sentence."
In order to judge the validity or invalidity of such rumors, it was necessary
for the author to determine what enlisted accused and their counsel do in
fact. This determination proved to be very worthwhile, because those judge
advocates participating in the day-to-day defense of enlisted accused do, in
fact, use enlisted members on certain types of clearly defined cases.
An analysis of the situations wherein enlisted members are desired on courts-
martial shows that they are generally non-military offenses. It is pertin-
ent to remember that most enlisted court members will be senior enlisted per-
sonnel, for that appears to be a significant factor. The senior enlisted mem-
ber is commonly a mature individual, widely traveled, and well acquainted
with human nature. More often than not, he will be a family man. By virtue
4 Hearings before a Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee on H.R. 2498,
81st Cong., 1st Sess., 1140 (1949).
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of his rank and position, it is likely that he is well acquainted with the dif-
ficulties of living within the financial limits of a soldier's means. He under-
stands, or at least is aware of, sexual problems inherent in long separation of
men from their wives. Similarly, he is familiar with the drives, frustrations,
and problems of the young men with whom he is in daily professional con-
tact. He is likely to adopt a tolerant attitude toward human shortcomings,
possessed by all individuals to a greater or lesser degree. These traits tend to
explain why he is desired as a court member in cases involving offenses aris-
ing from financial problems, offenses involving domestic difficulties, and of-
fenses where a soldier is in trouble because of sexual misconduct or overin-
dulgence in intoxicants.
Generally, a senior enlisted member would not be desired as a court mem-
ber in trials of military-type offenses unless the circumstances of the case
would lead to some kind of sympathetic identification with the accused. In
some military offenses, the offense will have arisen out of an officer-enlisted
dispute, or some other factor will be present which makes the enlisted mem-
ber identify with the accused and his predicament. In maltreatment cases,
the accused will normally be a training sergeant. The enlisted members serv-
ing upon his court-martial will also be sergeants, or their equivalent in the
specialist grades, and many of them will have served as training sergeants or
specialists themselves. It is understandable that they would be sympathetic
to the plight of the accused. In dereliction of duty cases, the offenses gener-
ally condoned by a custom of the service, enlisted members, like the civilian
jury, will apply the sense of the community to the accused, rather than static
rules of law unadaptable to the common experience of mankind. That en-
listed members are requested, and profitably so, can no longer be disputed.
It must be remembered that the above comments are, at best, generaliza-
tions. As in jury selection, there are no hard and fast rules.
B. How enlisted court members have performed.
Mentioned earlier is the rumor, of long duration and still current, that en-
listed members on courts-martial adjudge harsh sentences when they parti-
cipate in the judicial process. Another current tale tells that they are quick
to convict on a scintilla of evidence, Once again, it was important to distin-
guish what enlisted court-martial members do in fact, from what they are
reputed to do.
What officer-enlisted courts-martial do in fact in those limited situations
where they are desired because of attitudes favorable to the defense, as dis-
cussed above, when compared with all-officer courts-martial, is quite surpris-
ing. The comparison shows their acquittal percentage to be more than twice
that of the all-officer court-martial. This certainly refutes the claim that en-
listed members are hasty to convict.
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Likewise, in comparing eighteen cases involving generally similar offenses
and maximum sentences, the officer-enlisted courts-martial gave more leni-
ent sentences in nine cases, approximately tied with the all-officer courts-mar-
tial in six cases, and gave more severe sentences in only three cases. Thus one
can see that the idea that enlisted court members as a group are harsh, tough
martinets is without basis in fact, at least in today's army.
C. Enlisted members can be trained sufficiently in military justice.
In presenting arguments to Army Boards of Review and the United States
Court of Military Appeals asserting that members of all enlisted classes eli-
gible for selection should be selected for court-martial duty, whatever their
rank or grade, the defense bar was always met with the argument (from the
bench as well as from government counsel) that enlisted members, and espe-
cially the junior ones, were and are inadequately trained to perform well on
courts-martial.
The answer to this argument is that the Army Establishment itself is in
charge of military justice training, and those officials who speak for the de-
partment should not be heard on one hand to say, "enlisted members, and
particularly the junior ones, are not adequately trained to serve on courts-
martial so they will not be used," and on the other hand, in setting up the
Army's military justice educational program, to say, "enlisted members, and
particularly the junior ones, cannot be given more than minimal training
in military justice."
It is the belief of many persons closely connected with the court-martial
process that senior enlisted personnel are much better trained for effective
court-martial service than junior enlisted personnel. This belief may indeed
have a great deal of merit, not because of any inherent inability of junior
enlisted members to compete with their senior brethren, but because by Army
regulationsiii the juniors are regulated to minimal military justice training
while their senior counterparts, from E-5 and above, are not. In fact, those
enlisted members, E-4 and below, receive little more military justice train-
ing than that which is required by statute."16 Those E-5 and above, in addi-
tion to the statutory minimum, receive training which should give them a
clear understanding of both judicial and nonjudicial processes."
7
There seems to be an assumption in the Army that personnel with the
most knowledge of military justice matters, and therefore best qualified to
serve on courts-martial, are at the top of the grade structure with the senior
commissioned officers and descend by grade to the lower enlisted members,
"'Army Regs. No. 350-212 (14 Aug. 1964) [hereafter cited as AR 350-212].
"OAR 350-212, para. 2b (1) and 2b (2) are designed to give that military justice training
required by 10 U.S.C. § 937 (1958) (Art. 137, UCMJ), and three additional hours of general
instruction.
"I AR 350-212, para. 2b (3).
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with each rung in this ladder being a little less qualified to serve on courts-
martial. If this is true, then the military justice educational system should be
re-organized to give the most training to those who need it the most-the low-
er enlisted members. And the least training to those who need it the least-
the senior commissioned officers. Yet the training program presently in effect
is exactly the opposite; more training is provided for officer than for enlisted
personnel. 118
A broader consideration which merits some discussion is whether any train-
ing in military justice is really needed for prospective courts-martial mem-
bers. In the modern general court-martial, with which we are primarily con-
cerned, the members really perform the functions of a jury, and their duties
are not unlike that of civilian juries. Certainly no training is accorded to ci-
vilian jury members, since what is desired is a community consensus applied
to an accused rather than any pre-disposed conclusions obtained from legally
trained personnel. Doing away with military justice training, however, is not
presently possible because it is one of the important considerations applied
by a convening authority in selecting courts-martial members." 9 As training
is necessary in military law, it should be strengthened where it is needed the
most; in the lower enlisted ranks.
D. "Influence of Rank" over enlisted members is not a problem
Whether there is any "influence in rank" over enlisted members participa-
ting in courts-martial is, of course, a subject not open to direct study because
of the inviolability rule as to what occurs in closed courts-martial sessions.
Certainly, the beliefs of officials directly participating in courts-martial based
upon their observations and experience would be relevant, and might an-
swer our inquiry, thus their opinions were sought out. Unfortunately, there
is a lack of agreement on this issue. Of those officials queried, two law officers,
twenty-nine trial counsel and forty defense counsel believed such a problem
exists. However eleven law officers, forty-six trial counsel, and thirty-five de-
fense counsel believe the problem does not exist.
If by "influence in rank" one means some perfidious action by superior
officers directing enlisted court members to conform to the officer court mem-
ber's desires, then this should result in more convictions and equally severe
sentences by officer-enlisted courts-martial when compared to all-officer courts-
martial. In fact, the opposite result has occurred. Officer-enlisted courts-mar-
lu Compare AR 350-212, para. 2b (1), (2), and (3), which concern enlisted training with
para. 2c (1), (2), (3), and (4), providing for officer training. It is fully understood, of course,
that military justice training for officers extends to many areas beyond mere qualification for
court membership, as officers also must administer the entire military justice system. There
is certainly no objection in providing officers with more training than enlisted personnel;
but there is a valid objection to denying enlisted personnel sufficient training so that con-
vening authorities consider them ineligible for court-martial duty due to lack of training.
'-sArts. 25 (d) and 137, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. §§ 825 (d) (2) and 937 (1958).
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tial have a higher percentage of acquittals and less severe sentences than all-
officer courts-martial. Therefore, it appears clear that no substantial, if any,
problem exists with "influence in rank" over enlisted court-martial members.
Members of the military service, officers and enlisted alike, are not un-
mindful of the changes wrought in military justice since World War 11.120 The
very fact that enlisted members were made eligible to sit upon courts-martial
attests to their judicial equality with officers, regardless of rank. Law officers
regularly instruct that "The influence of superiority in rank shall not be
employed in any manner in an attempt to control the independence of mem-
bers in the exercise of their judgment." 121 As all of the facts point toward an
absence of any "influence in rank" problem in courts-martial, the conclu-
sion that there is none is inescapable.
VIII.
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
We have seen that historically our military legal system, which was adopted
from the British, was an anomaly. It comported with the concept that an up-
per class had the right and duty to judge the common man who, unrepre-
sented, must acquiesce because he was deemed incompetent to govern him-
self. Such a system could not survive in a free democracy where no man is
deemed common. Thus in the military reforms after World War I1, enlisted
members for the first time were made eligible for court-martial duty. This
was done for two reasons. First, it extended the real meaning of democracy
to the military legal system, wresting it from the age-old captivity of Euro-
pean class doctrine. Secondly, the enlisted members, by participating, would
gain confidence in the basic fairness of the court-martial system, and such
participation would also provide training to selected members of the en-
listed community.
To the extent that enlisted participation has been utilized, it has worked
very well. There are definite types of cases where officer-enlisted courts-mar-
tial are beneficial to an enlisted accused, and they have generally adjudged
lighter sentences than all-officer courts-martial.
In four areas, however, there are grave deficiences. First, in selecting en-
listed members or officers for court-martial duty under the present system,
the convening authority usually has before him only a list of names preceded
by the individual's rank or grade. Hence, it is impossible for the convening
authority to comply knowledgeably with the requirements of Article 25 (d)
(2) of the Uniform Code of Military Justice ... choose those whom he be-
'" Of 129 enlisted members asked if they knew of enlisted representation on courts-martial.
122 replied they did; only 7 replied they did not.
m MCM, 1951, para. 74 d (1).
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lieves best qualified by reason of age, education, training, experience, length
of service, and judicial temperament ... in selecting court members. There-
fore, the present selection system needs to be improved in this area. Second,
in the Army, only senior enlisted members, with rare exceptions, are se-
lected for general courts-martial duty.1 22 While this is evidently legal, it is a
substandard policy for it means that our military courts are still unrepresent-
ative tribunals. Any group excluded from participation in the judicial proc-
ess will be suspicious of that process, and until all are represented on courts-
martial, these tribunals will not be accepted by all to the extent desirable,
and possible, in our system of law. This does not mean that all enlisted mem-
bers should be selected at random. It does,however, mean that those lower
grade enlisted members, who can meet the qualifications of Article 25 (d)
(2) of the Uniform Code of Military Justice on an individual basis, should
be selected for, and not excluded from, general court-martial duty. Third,
enlisted accused find themselves acting as their own legal advisor on the ques-
tion of whether or not to request enlisted membership on their court-martial
trial. In response to the author's inquiry, two defense counsel replied that
they did not even advise an accused of his right to request enlisted members.
Twenty-eight replied that while they did advise an accused of his right to
have enlisted members, their advice was confined to that information, and
consequently was of little or no assistance to the accused in making a choice.
Although it is true that the final decision is personal to an accused, when
counsel fail to give tactical advice on this important question, they abdicate
their responsibilities. Fourth, all enlisted members, but particularly those
in grades E-1 to E-4, should receive more intensive training in military jus-
tice so that they will not be considered by convening authorities to be in-
eligible for court-martial duty because of inadequate training.
Means for correcting these deficiencies are at hand, and can be readily
utilized. With respect to the area of selection procedures, a departmental
regulation could establish the commissioner system discussed in this paper,
and the operation of such a system would provide convening authorities with
the information necessary to the proper exercise of their discretion in select-
ing court members. The system would have the further virtue of doing this
on a uniform, Army-wide basis. Court members could then be selected under
a program that would take into account their individual qualifications for
InFor those, like Judge Kilday, who believe that trial by court-martial is trial by one's
superiors, and democratic influences have no proper part to play, the author refers the reader
to the following language from the legislative hearing on the Code's enlisted member pro-
vision.
"Mr. River.... Can we say that this whole provision [Article 25 (d) (1) UCMJ] here gives
a man an opportunity to be tried by a jury of his peers?
"Mr. Smart. A jury composed of at least one-third of his peers, I would say." Hearings be-
fore a Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee on H.R. 2498, 81st Cong., 1st
Sess., 1140 (1949).
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court duty, thus insuring complete conformity with the requirements of the
Code. Insofar as advice to the accused is concerned, the present deficiencies
can be remedied by making defense counsel aware of their responsibility to
provide sound tactical guidance regarding the wisdom of requesting an en-
listed court in any given case. Finally, the obvious answer to deficiencies in
the training of enlisted personnel regarding military justice lies in strength-
ening and expanding the current educational and training program.
We are living in a time when the law is moving forward with a rapidity
that would have astounded earlier generations of lawyers. Perhaps this is as
it should be, in view of the enormous advance of technology during this cen-
tury. At least, in a world where seething discontent is the order of the day
in so many areas of the globe, we should not be surprised to find that in the
realm of law, too, cries are heard demanding reform and progress. Our mod-
ern American law is not the English law of Charles Dickens' day-law which
all too often was the instrument of the privileged upper classes, insensitive
to the rights, and bearing primarily on the duties, of the masses.123 Instead,
our developing contemporary jurisprudence is replete with instances of re-
examination of hitherto accepted and unquestioned doctrines from out of
the past, asking anew whether those doctrines measure up to the increasing-
ly high standard of due process which we are coming to expect from our
courts. Cases such as Escobedo v. Illinois,124 Jackson v. Denno,2 5 Gideon v.
Wainwright,126 and Massiah v. United Sates,'27 are making it plain that it is
no longer sufficient to answer "stare decisis," or "so it was laid down in the
time of Henry IV."' 1 28 Modem criminal law must square with the facts of life,
and if it does not, it will be changed; this is no longer doubted. Our present
Uniform Code of Military Justice is living proof of the fact.
The military services learned much from the storms of protest and dissent
which arose out of the American citizen-soldier's experiences with military
justice in World War II. Instead of resisting the coming changes, the Army
acknowledged the validity of many of the complaints, and took an affirma-
tive and commendable part in the birth of the incipient reforms. 29 The
Army's field judiciary system was hailed as a successful and effective innova-
tion.13 0 Following the successful experience with the field judiciary system, the
2 See DICKENs, BLEAK HOUSE 2-7 (Oxford ed. 1956).
"'378 U.S. 478 (1964).
"2378 U.S. 1 (1964).
"' 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
377 U.S. 201 (1964).
Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. Rav. 457, 469 (1897).
" Indeed, it is a source of great pride to the Army's Judge Advocate General's Corps that
such an officer as General Samuel T. Ansell advocated, from within the Army, progressive
and much needed reforms well ahead of his time as long ago as 1918.
m°Wiener, The Army's Field Judiciary System: A Notable Advance, 46 A.B.A.J. 1178-1183
(1960).
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Army created its United States Army Judiciary-the all-encompassing or-
ganization which comprises and operates the military justice program. 31 The
Army augments the operation of its military justice activities by maintain-
ing a post-graduate level law school at Charlottesville, Virginia. These ex-
amples serve to illustrate the fact that the Army can affirmatively lead in de-
veloping military criminal justice, rather than waiting passively to be led at
the whims of civilian reformers. The great effectiveness of the Army's past
assumptions of leadership in this area attests to the wisdom of continuing
the tradition now firmly established. Not the least of the advantages obtained
thereby in this: military lawyers and judges know best what change is neces-
sary in the system with which they work on a daily professional basis.
It is significant to note that the other armed services have followed the
Army's lead in initiating internal improvements in the administration of
military justice,182 and thus in a very real sense, the Army is in a position to
continue to give direction and service-wide guidance by its progressive at-
titude.
In light of all this, the time is ripe for development of a democratically ma-
ture, Army-wide program regarding the selection of enlisted members for
court-martial duty and their effective utilization in modern military criminal
trial procedure. Once again, as in the recent past, the Army can anticipate
the demands for reform from civilian quarters and meet the indicated need
independently by internal processes. In this manner, the required changes
can be made in such a way as to insure that the Army will be able to perform
its mission effectively. Indeed, the suggested measures should enhance the
effectiveness of the military justice system, and thus materially support the
overall mission of the Army.
In view of the increasing egalitarian spirit and direction of the criminal
law in America, it seems inevitable that our jurisprudence will not counte-
nance much longer any system of criminal trial using a lay fact-finding body
which is not thoroughly democratic in nature and operation. As noted in
this paper, our present scheme of military justice is basically democratic to
the extent that it has rid itself of the monarchial trappings of the ancient
British code from which it came.
I.t is submitted that Congress legislated wisely in providing for enlisted
membership on courts-martial. Since Congress imposed no class restrictions
on the basis of rank, other than to prevent trial by one's military juniors un-
less unavoidable, it would be appropriate for the Army to eliminate the last
vestiges of class discrimination inherited from the parent system. Then the
military accused would enjoy protection comparable to that of his civilian
counterpart before the analogous body, the jury.
"I Gen. Orders No. 56, Hq. Dep't of Army (26 Sept. 1962).
C reach, Congress Looks to the Serviceman's Rights, 49 A.B.A.J. 1070, 1074 (1963).
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